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Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) 
1. Introduction 
The current creation and formation of regional trading and economic blocks falls into a time 
period which is characterised not only by the disintegration of "real socialism" ["Real­
Sozialismus"] and the decline of the hegemonic role of the USA, but by the quickly 
growing processes of internationalisation and globalisation of products, and the flow of 
capital and finances. Various tendencies overlap one another, although the assertion of one 
over the other is not discemible. Globalisation and the stretching out of free trade (GATT, 
WTO) run parallel to transcontinental block-building (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, etc.). "The 
world economic order is ( ...) characterised by a dual process of protectionism and free 
trade, or rather, by regionalism and multilateralism" (Lavon 1994, 20). Since the second 
half of the 80s, in Latin America also, the revitalisation or inauguration of cases of 
economic integration can be observed: MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay), the "Group of the three" (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia), the "Andean Pact" , 
including Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela and the signing of many 
bilateral trade agreements (Fritsch 1994, 4ft). 
Accordingly, NAFTA can be understood as an expression of achanging world' economic 
order and likewise be analysed as an especially interesting example of world economic 
regionalisation. From numerous problen1s connected with the NAFTA process, only few 
shall be selected and discussed in this short paper. The motives and goals of the NAFTA 
forn1ation, looked at fron1 the US and Canadian perspective, are object of study in other 
contrlbutions (see for example Lavon 1994 for USA and Hirschkom 1996 in this volume). 
In this paper I will refer to the conditions, motives and goals from the 'Mexican perspective; 
the n1ain content of the agreement will be sketched very briefly; also the new social and 
economic actors, who exerted pressure in favour of the agreement will be briefly analysed. 
Finally, the political and economic implications of NAFTA on Mexico will be examined. 
2. Conditions, Motives, Goal-Setting 
A general and historical condition for Mexico' s rapprochement to the NAFT A is the highly 
interwoven trade of the two countries, although the nature and magnitude of Mexico' s trade 
relations with the USA is notably and unequally more important than the reverse case. As is 
well known, Mexico carries out more than two thirds of its exports and imports with its 
northem neighbour. On the other hand, the USA's trade with Mexico represents only 
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approximately 4% of its trade volume. The capital mobility - in both directions - represents 
both a partly-lamented as weIl as a partly-welcomed phenomena which influences, above 
all , the Mexican economy. Due to this clearly asymmetrical relation between the two 
countries and due to other large differences (wage rates, productivity levels, education and 
health systems) it was nearly unforeseeable in the early 1980s that these "distant 
neighbours" (A. Riding) could wiIlingly approve a regional integration project. Many 
factors are responsible for this far-reaching change of mind. For one, with the failure and 
subsequent abandonment of aversion of Import Substitution Industrialisation, the country's 
increasing openness appeared imminent. The manifested weaknesses arising from the debt 
crisis and additional pronounced foreign dependency, as weIl as internal societal and 
economic regrouping, made the change of course, which was already made clear in 
Mexico I s contribution to the GATI (1986), almost unavoidable. In light of the 
disintegration of the "real socialist systems" ["realsozialistischen Systemen] as weIl as the 
growing turn of important European states towards Eastern Europe, a real political and eco­
nomic strategical dependence on the USA appeared to be recommendable as weIl. The 
adoption of austerity policies and the neoliberal turn under Miguel de la Madrid in 1982 
was indeed unsuccessful in inlportant aspects (inflation, budget deficit, etc.), however it 
revealed other elements of economic policy intended for a reconciliation with the USA 
(privatisation, liberalisation of trade barriers). The continuation and intensification of this 
policy under Salinas de Gortari even brought success in fighting inflation and reducing the 
budget deficit, so that there were virtually no objections even from this side which would 
have stood in the way of the initiation of the NAFTA process (June 1990).1 
The Salinas de Gortari administration pursued other goals with the enforcement of the 
NAFT A negotiations. Overall, an external institutionalisation of neo liberal politics was 
supposed to protect it from possible fluctuations, especially conceivable with the intended 
democratisation process. Secondly, a stabilisation of the PRI-regime, politicallyas well as 
economically, was intended. This was also closely tied to Mexico' s hopes to remove itself 
from the Third World and Latin America and instead enable its demarche into the circles of 
the First World Countries. Among others, the expectation was expressed, and likewise a 
propagandised version articulated, that economic growth would be enabled by such an 
integration process with the USA and Canada: above all, elements of underdevelopment in 
Mexico would be overcome through an assurance of access to the US-American market, 
through the release of new investors in Mexico and the related transfer of capital and new 
technological know-how. Indeed, losers of this integration project were to be expected, 
however the advantages for Mexico were estimated on the balance to be much better. 
For more details about neoliberal economic policyin this time period, see: Boris 1995, 291ff and my 




3. Main Content of the Agreement 
The Agreement as weH as Clinton' s side agreements for environmental and labour standards 
contain the foHowing elements: 
a) 	 Successive and asymmetrical reduction of tariffs between Mexico and the USA/Canada 
for the increasingly larger percentages of goods and services crossing the borders. 
b) 	 Liberalisation of capital transfers, partialliberalisation of corporate investment rights for 
banks, granting of insurance rights in the respective partner states (after 6 years). 
c) 	 FuH equalisation of foreign and domestic investment. 
d) 	 Rules for determination of origin which define if, for example, a product produced in 
Mexico is classified as aMexican product or - in case too great of a share of the 
unfinished products and components originate fron1 a foreign country - as a foreign 
product. 
e) 	 Special exemptions for individual branches and sectors (e.g., the textile sector and 
agriculture sector; confirmation of the continuation of state monopolies in electricity and 
oil sectors in Mexico). 
f) 	 Problems of labour mobility were predominantly ignored; exemptions conceming the 
liberalisation of reciprocal migration is limited to the highly qualified labour force. 
g) 	 The agreement contains detailed concepts about the institutionalised settlement of 
conflicts (refer to Lavon 1994, 43ff). 
In the first side-agreement which was conc1uded in September 1993, the USA hoped to 
introduce fine tariffs for the violation of labour and environmental standard sanctions. This 
action was partly successful in regards to Mexico, however in Canada's case, no 
modification in regards to the original agreement text was implemented (Lauth 1994, 10ff). 
4. Advocates and Supporters of the NAFfA 
Above all , Mexico' s president Carlos Salinas de Gortari must be mentioned as the most 
visible public advocate of the NAFTA. It is no exaggeration to remark that the NAFTA 
project has been the central issue of his term in government. Without provoking a real 
discussion in the country, this has been the omnipresent theme in the Mexican public since 
1990/91, presented unchallenged as an alternative which contains the salvation for Mexico's 
prevailing needs and deficits. Correspondingly, the treatment of this topic was suppressed in 
the media; only in several leftist intellectual newspapers and publications, nan1ely of the 
middle-Ieftist wing (such as the PRD), could counterarguments be found. Without doubt, 
Salinas de Gortari expected "foreign support", an acceleration and above all an 
institutionalisation for his neoliberal economic policy. At the same time NAFT A was also a 
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lever for the new formation and restructuring of the ruling coalition which was now 
supposed to include the large bourgeoisie, export and import-oriented sections of the trading 
middle class, parts of the middle class such as top bureaucrats, or rather technocrats. The 
reference to the labour sectors, farmer interest groups or the so-called "popular sectors" 
["sectores populares"] was relegated significantly to the background in public rhetoric; 
which did not, of course, exclude the possibility of these social sectors being included in 
various solidarity pacts. 
The propaganda for the NAFTA project did not relate in any means to only Mexico itself, 
but rather , the Mexican govemment was also extraordinarily active in the USA. Many 
observers even remarked that the most lobby activity for the NAFT A in the USA was 
directly or indirectly sponsored by the Mexican govemment. This campaign was the'longest 
and most expensive foreign lobbying campaign that the US capital has ever experienced. 
"According to official statements, since 1989 the Mexican governnlent and employer 
organisations have spent 25 million US$ in order to further the development and ratification 
of the NAFTA" (Lavon 1994, 79). 
The Department for Trade and Industry (SECOFI) and the Finance Department were 
actively involved in the NAFTA process; above all , the newly established Coordination 
Council for Export ("Coordinadora de Organismos Empresariales de Comercio Exterior" 
(COECE) became the important panel for co-ordination between the govemment and 
export-oriented private business. Almost all of the employee organisations in Mexico 
clearly and energetically supported the free trade agreement. Only the interest group for 
small and medium-size industrialists ("Camera Nacional de la Industria de 
Transformaci6n ", CANACINTRA), which is strongly oriented towards the domestic market 
and profited from the protectionist customs barriers, expressed a moderate scepticism. 
However, even they quickly set aside their own scepticism and gave their definitive support 
for the NAFTA, because the promise of stability and growth and the prospect of better 
relations with the govemment left them in a situation where they were "ready to make 
sacrifices11. The roles of other authorities or institutions (legislative, political parties, 
unions, other interest groups, intellectuals, etc.) were secondary in relation to the 
mentioned propagandists. Riding on the growing wave of popularity from a small economic 
uptum, a sinking inflation rate and a social program made highly visible (PRONASOL), 
Salinas de Gortari' s initiative became so popular, that at the end of 1991, approximately 2/3 
of the Mexican population supported the NAFTA project, although the majority assumed ­
contrary to most official economic analyses - that the USA would profit more strongly from 
the agreement than Mexico. In light of the NAFTA, Mexican politics showed that economic 
libe~alisation and adapted authoritarianism are thoroughly compatible· with one another. 
"The blending of authoritarian rule and economic liberalisation in Mexico took on several 
characteristics. First, the state assumed the task of liberalising its foreign economic policy, 
particularly regarding the NAFTA. Second, the presidency was able to recalibrate the 
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coalition to sustain liberal economic policies within an authoritarian framework. Third, the 
restructuring of the coalition was accomplished without sacrificing the elites hold on power 
and without risking instability . Fourth, the ascendancy of some important groups, especially 
the private sector , within the coalition at the expense of those who had relied upon 
traditional corporatism for representation in the coalition in the past has made possible a 
multi-class, but less inclusionary, strategy for economic liberalisation. Fifth, the 
consolidation of support without a full sca1e national debate on free trade, while allowing 
the critics to carp from the sidelines, is consistent with, and indeed reinforced, the system's 
legendary ability to gain popular support without submitting to popular rule. What the late 
1980s and the early 1990s revealed is that authoritarian rule in Mexico is more formidable 
than even its detractors could ·have surmised." (Poitras/Robinson 1994, 28t). 
5. The Effects ofthe NAFfA on the Mexican Economy 
Since the ratification of the NAFT A this has been the central question of many hundreds of 
studies which have in turn produced too many different, contradictory statements about the 
possible outcomes of the NAFTA process. The wide scope can be explained by the newness 
of this phenomena of regional integration, and among others, that very different economies 
and societies are being brought together in a manner never seen before. The divergence also 
results fronl the varying assessments of the question, whether the existing asymmetry in the 
agreement is adequately or inadequately considered, in other words, if the desired new 
conditions can be stimulated sufficiently or if this will result in effects which predominantly 
serve a liquidation al function.The majority of reports about the NAFTA project emerged 
when the negotiations were not yet finalised, or rather , when the NAFTA was not yet 
ratified. As well, the real experience with the NAFTA only reaches back about two years. 
The fact that NAFT A was more urgent and nlore important for Mexico than its entrance 
into the bilateral Free Trade Agreement between theUSA and Canada and the condition 
that Mexico - moreover because of its undemocratic structures - had to submit itself more 
quickly to the negotiation process (Ros 1992, 78ft) refer to the possible lack of adequate 
attention paid to the deep asymnletry between the USA and Mexico. 
Without dealing with details (nor a methodical nature), two important dimensions of the 
Agreement text - the agricultural sector and the industrial sector - should be briefl.y analysed 
for their meaning to Mexico. 
5.1. The agricultural sector 
The Mexican aglicultural sector , which was traditionally controlled by the state in various 
respects (prices, credit, .marketing, infrastructure, agricultural inputs from state-owned 
companies), was already seized by neoliberal deregulation, or rather, by state withdrawal 
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during the administration of Migue1 de 1a Madrid. Opening borders, price liberalisation, 
restructuring of the credit system in the direction of a radical cutting of state contributions, 
privatisation of state enterprises, etc~ were intended not to establish a hope for progress in 
agricu1ture reform, but rather , to establish the perspective of an "agricultural modemisation 
and capitalisation". According to the ideas of the Salinas de Gortari administration, above 
al1 two elements were supposed to determine and acce1erate the further deve10pment of the 
Mexican agricu1tural industry: one, the introduction of the North American FreeTrade 
Agreement, and the other - in a c10se1y re1ated context - the reform of artic1e 27 of the 
Mexican constitution, through which the privatisation of Ejido land cou1d be made possib1e. 
Both projects will, without a doubt, have a considerab1e impact on agriculture in the 
medium-term. 
It is well known that the quantitative and qualitative differences in agricultural-resource en­
dowment are strong1y pronounced; the public subsidies in the agricu1tural sectors in the 
USA and Canada are also unequal1y higher than in Mexico. One must not be an agricu1tural 
specialist or an economist in order to understand that the openness to trade for agricu1tural 
products will also have a far-reaching destructive impact on 1arge parts of present Mexican 
agriculture. Several staple products (corn, beans, wheat, milk and others) are somewhat 
protected by temporary non-tariff barriers. If a full-fledged libenüisation were implemented 
here - and this is due to current and near-future productivity differences which are hard1y 
insurmountable - this wou1d mean the socia1-economica1 end of approximately 3.5 million 
Campesino families (Calva 1992, 13 and 20). In addition, the secondary effects on the 
whole economy, such as the condition of the conlp1ete 10ss of the food supply from 10ca1 
sources, need to be accounted for. These grave consequences will certainly not be balanced 
by advantages in other subsectors of the Mexican agriculture (sugar, citrus fruits, winter 
vegetab1es, cut flowers); and this also means that the resulting deve10pments from the free 
trade agreement will by no means be nothing but favourable for the US agricultural sector . 
"In both the United States and Mexico, the single largest areas of negative impact are likely 
to be rural. In Mexico, this conclusion is based on the impact NAFTA will have on 
production of basic grains for subsistence. In the U nited States, it is related to the 
concentration of 10w-wage, low-productivity jobs as non-farm emp10yment in rural 
America" (Conroy/Glasmeier 1992/93, 18). 
The view that the Mexican agricultural sector could maintain a kick-start in modernisation, 
productivity increase and agility through this agreement appears difficult to grasp, in light 
of the great differences in pre-existing conditions and the foreseeable (to a large degree, 
more likely opposite) effects. A greater dependency on purchasing and sales and a greater 
polarisation of the rate of productivity and living conditions in the various areas of the 
Mexican agricu1tural sector will evidently be a direct consequence of neoliberal economic 
policies and the corresponding free trade policy. The social unrest in the countryside has 
greatly increased in recent years; the revolt in Chiapas was on1y the most c1ear and visible 
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example of this tendency. In many other regions a similarly large protest-potential has built 
up among Mexico's agricultural population (refer to EI Cotidiano, No. 61, March/April 
1994, 82ft). 
5.2. The industrial sector 
It is more difficult to assess the consequences of the NAFTA for Mexican industry than its 
effects on the agricultural sector . Apart from complicated and methodical evaluation 
questions, it must above all remain open, firstly, whether only relatively few work intensive 
branches in Mexico, or also others, will be strengthened in the wake of greater market 
expansion; and secondly, whether the import effects on smaller and medium-sized Mexican 
industry will be so difficult that sections of businesses in the industry will disappear; and 
finally, it remains unclear how large the expected flow of foreign capital resulting from the 
integration process will be, and what role it will play in the new structuring of the Mexican 
economy. Before attempting to answer these questions, it is necessary to provide an 
overview of the restructuring of Mexican industry in the 1980s. Industry characterised by 
foreign openness and a stronger export orientation gained, overall, Httle in the 1980s. Its 
share of the GDP actually declined and the industrial product per capita in 1981 was only 
reached again in 1991. The non-oil exports, the industrial exports that is, did indeed grow 
quickly during the 1980s, partly with a growth rate of about 25 %, but then fell considerably 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the import growth similarly 
accelerated, resulting in a differentiated import and export growth rhythm and accounting 
for the emerging negative trade balancesince 1990. Despite a11 the talk about and planning 
for a modemisation of industry and a "Reconversion Industrial", the investment quota in 
industry during the 1980s and even at the beginning of the 1990s never reached the 
magnitude of the 1960s and 1970s. The complete economic investment quota remained 
static for a long time at 16% during the crisis decade, and then rose from 17 to 18 % (in 
relation to the GDP) at the beginning of the 1990s. The growth rate of the increase in 
productivity remained at just over 1 % per year in the industrial sector, clearly under the 
respective growth rate of the previous decade. A regrouping of the industrial production 
apparatus had been carried out to the degree that branch-specific accentuation (above all in 
the non-metallic mineral sector: glass industry, cement industry, for example)is visible, as 
well as a regional restructuring in favour of the northern and central states, and a well as a 
further clear concentration of industrial production in the largest companies could be noted 
(refer to Sotelo Valencia 1993, 67ff; Velasco Arregui 1993, 169). 
Even if one limits the evaluation criteria for the effects of the free trade agreenlent on 
industry to a few, for example, the contribution to the GDP or income growth, the 
employment rate and the development of productivity - many questions renlain, since the 
prevailing premises can be very diverse. Completely apart from this, the general difficulty 
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lies in attributing the economic implications for the Mexican economy to the neoliberal 
reforms in general, or to NAFTA in particular. 
In the majority of the studies, great advantages - absolute and relative - are seen (refer to 
Weintraub 1992, 109ft). Above all, the better access of Mexican exports to the US market 
in specific branches (clothing, cement, glass, steel, shoes, etc.) is stressed. On the other 
hand, Mexico's los ses in terms of higher imports of capital goods, electric machines, 
chemical products, etc. from the USA is not considered to be so large, since these branches 
in Mexico are not very strongly represented anyway. Gains in wages, employment and 
productivity development would go along with an improved "industrial trade balance" in 
favour of Mexico. Sceptics meet this argument by pointing out that the access to the US 
market right before the agreement were (with several exceptions) relatively favourable and 
that the possibilities of export increases in work intensive branches through theMaquiladora 
industries, which grew strongly in the last few years, were already exhausted. A more clear 
connection between export increases, employment growth and progress in productivity has, 
in accordance, not yet been present. In regards to these non-existent, supposedly 
endogenous effects of productivity, Jaime Ros remarked that "virtuous circ1es between 
exports, investment and productivity growth have so far largely been absent" (Ros 1992, 
137). 
On the other hand, it must· be supposed that the expected flow of imports vis-a-vis the 
NAFT A and the liberalisation of trade barriers will have broader consequences than what 
the optimistic argumentation of the NAFTA advocators profess: simply the stabile 
incongruence of import growth rates and export growth rates since the end of the 1980s and 
the enduring trade balance deficit that resulted, points out that many industrial products 
which were previously produced in Mexico were swept to the side through the import 
competition. The raising .of the import coefficient (percentage of imports compared with the 
total internal demand) means that a diversion of already-present demand must have taken 
place (refer to Huerta Gonzhles 1993, 42t). In this context it is worth remarking that the 
employment in Mexico's industrial sec tor from 1982 to 1994 decreased by more that 
200.000; at the same time the number of potentially employed grew to around 10-12 
million. In the 12 years between 1982 and 1994, nine branches, or rather branch groups, 
were characterised by negative growth. The strongest decrease was in industrial 
employment in 1983 and again in 1993 and 1994. A few of the branch groups, specifically 
foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco ,registered a slight increase in employment volumes 
during the same time periode The combined group of metallic products, machines and 
equipment, which represented one third of the complete industrial workforce (350.000) 
since 1982, dwindled to 241.000 in 1994. It is no coincidence that, specifically in these 
branches, the reduction of employment was the largest whereas at the same time they regis­
tered the strongest import growth rate (refer to de la Luz Arriaga Lemus 1995, 10ft). 
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The additional flow of foreign capital resulting from the NAFT A is varyingly estimated. 
According to the opinion of no small number of authors, this factor, e.g. the expected 
amount of incoming capital due to the free trade agreement, in terms of how it relates not 
only to growth processes and employment expansion, but also to productivity increases, is 
considered to be more im1?0rtant than the reduction of the trade barriers and the 
intensification of trade exchange. The estimates for the expected annual inflow of foreign 
capital stretch from about 3 billion US$ to 6 billion US$ (Koechlin et al. 1992, quoted by 
Lavon 1994, 85), explicitly meaning the shift of investment from the USA to Mexico. 
Accordingly, the left-over capital which did not stern from the USA is not included in these 
figures. Especially this segment of foreign capital investment (e.g. non-US) had raised great 
hopes in Mexico while foreign transnational companies from Europe or Japan viewed 
Mexico as a sort of starting gate for a new integrated regional market. According to the 
view of the USA, such a plan should be hindered directly through the relatively restrictive 
framework of the so-called "original rule". The development of direct foreign investment in 
the years prior to 1991 until 1994 was actually no where near as rapid as the Mexican 
govemment had expected. 60-70 % of the inflowing foreign capital was in the form of 
portfolio investment which had no direct effect on the development of production and 
employment. Not a small portion of direct investments was employed in Debt-for Equity 
Swaps and/or in the .preliminaries of the privatisation of state companies (some authors 
estimate this portion of inyestment at 50% of the total foreign investment in recent years). 
A further portion of active direct investment was applied to the expansion of the 
Maquiladora industries, whose portion of Mexico's total exports rose from approximately 
30% to 40% in recent years. Even if the foreign investment was not solely or 
predominantly applied to Mexic'o' s special sectors of comparative advantage (work intensive 
production, energy and raw material intensive production), but rather was also directed to 
capital intensive and technologically demanding productive sectors (automobile production, 
for example), likewise positive macro-economic effects can not be easily assumed. The 
deepening of specialisation which is not geared to the national economy but rather to the 
regional or even global economy, is the principle cause for not rea1ising the development of 
new technologies within the country and for not intemalising the multiplicator effects of 
investment. The fragility, dependence and foreign determination of the economy will be 
increased; the work force surplus, which is caused by job-losses in other sectors (agriculture 
and small and middle-sized industry), can lead to wage pressures. A not inconsiderable 
quota of foreign investment, as well as domestic investment, belong to the new category of 
"fragmented export orientation" . This term refers to the partially manufactured goods which 
have relatively little value-added, which are exported and represent no new technological 
product advancement. The problem of growing unemployment, the increase of informal 
sectors and the extreme unequal distribution of income and assets has, as is well known, 
been aggravated during the 1980s in Mexico. Moreover, this category of fragmented export 
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orientation appears to have reached its limits in the 1990s: the exhaustion of industrial 
expansion, the flooding of imports and the stagnation of labour productivity support this 
thesis: "The fragmentary export project, launched in 1983, is not a viable strategy for the 
long-term competitiveness of the Mexican industrial sector . It has reorganised Mexico' s in­
dustries as low-value-added productive segments in other nation' s value chains. This seg­
mented industrialisation, driven by TNCs, does not promote an integrated industrial 
network and does not promote sustainable and stable growth. One important indicator is that 
productive investment has not significantly increased. TNCs have once again established 
disarticulted export-oriented enclaves within what is, overall, a highly polarised 
industrialised structure. The Mexican economy remains incapable of serving growing needs 
- in particular, integrating huge numbers of rural-urban migrants into the labour force. 
Public infrastructures have been stretched beyond their limits, especially in the maquiladora 
border zone, where municipalities lack the ability to raise taxes for fear of losing foreign 
investment. Equally troubling is that this phase of export industrialisation has been as 
exclusionary as ISI [Import Substitution Industrialisation, D.B.] was before it. For the 
broad masses of Mexican peoples, who must seek the basic comforts of life within a 
primitive domestic industrial structure and deteriorating public infrastructure, this is simply 
not good enough" (Velasco Arregui 1993, 173).2 
6. Conclusion 
Within the neoliberal paradigm, the conclusion of a free trade agreement such as the 
NAFTA cultivates a logical sequel; maybe it can also be interpreted as an attempt to regain 
momentum for the obviously failed neoliberal project between 1982 to 1988. The limits of 
this political-economic strategy, due to the current outward orientation, will possibly be 
shifted or obscured. A degree of revitalisation of economic activities, short or long-term, 
need not be excluded. However, it will always be a very particular dynamic which will 
affect only part of the Mexican economy. This outward-orientated neoliberalism cannot 
realise a domestic-market based on distributive and productive economic policy which 
satisfies the needs of the masses. This project appears just as unlikely to be in a position to 
weaken or eliminate the considerable and recently growing social and regional polarisation 
in Mexico. A homogenisation of the economy and society is hardly expected due to broader 
Apart from a few branches in which Mexico has the same level of productivity as the USA 
(automobiles~ automobile parts, glass and cement industry, for example), capital from branches in 
which the corre~ponding productivity differences tend to be larger than the wage differences will again 
receive investment preference in the USA, on the basis of the almost completely. eliminated customs 
barriers. There the advantages of economies of scale, the required know-how, the desired worker 
qualifications, the infrastructure, etc. , will have considerable weight. Export to Mexico is more 
favourable under these conditions than on-site production. Refer here to the presentation of numerous 





and inereasing foreign determination and the weakening of state intervention eapabilities. 
The internationalised part of the Mexiean eeonomy willlikely adapt itself in many aspects 
to the eonditions of its northern economie partner. The remaining parts will still be further 
removed . from these standards as will be measured by several soeial and eeonomie 
indieators. 
This polarising tendeney will not, ineidenta1ly, be offset by national or international 
equalisation or eompensatory mechanisms between the NAFTA partners. In eontrast to the 
EU, for example, these dimensions in the NAFTA are eompletely left out (refer to Bulmer­
Thomas et al. 1994, 208). The agreement text is aetually striking because its institutional 
design (with a view to expansion, eonfliet resolution, monitoring of the provisions, ete.) is 
unusually limited and in this form will eertainly also be put to the test in real praetiee (for 
this shorteoming, refer in partieular to CastafiedalHeredia 1993, 43ft). 
From this perspeetive, the predominant euphorie judgements3 shaped by harmonious notions 
of the "North Ameriean Free Trade Agreement" should be relativised to the eontext of the 
eurrent soeio-economie eonditions. The latest precipitous erisis in the Mexiean economy 
and its politieal eonsequenees must also offer soeial seientists further warning against the 
all-too naive attempts at merging the interests of expanding US eapital and the export­
orientated Bourgeoisie fraetions in Mexieo with those of the dependent employed and/or 
impoverished segments of the population in the USA, Canada and especially Mexieo. 
translated by Kristine Hirschkorn 
Albrecht von Gleich understands "NAFTA as a manifestation of a new attitude of the USA in relation 
to its southem neighbours, in that the willingness to engage in contractual relationships characterised by· 
partnership and equal rights and the acknowledgement of the principal of economic . integration are 
expressed, for which little sympathy has been shown up until now" (Gleich, v. 1993, 43). With similar 
premature praise Hans Joachim Lauth sees "the realisation of the NAFTA as the most ambitious and 
likewise the most success-promising plan of actual cooperative and integrative measures on the 
American continent" (Lauth 1994, 3). The tendencies visible since 1990 were realised in the same 
tempo in the first year that the NAFTA was in effect (Financial Times, 23/11/94, 17): an extremely 
swift export growth from the USA to Mexico, and conversely a c1early deteriorated rate of export 
increase from Mexico to the USA. A good three-quarters of the Mexican trade balance deficit (from 28 
billion US$ = 8 % of the 1994 GDP ), which was a decisive and triggering element of the economic 
and financial crisis in 1994/95. goes back to US-Mexican trade. The USA's emerging trade balance 
deficit with Mexico for the end of 1995, which was due to strong devaluation, repeated wage-sinking, 
etc., was at a level of 17 billion US$ Together with production shifts to Mexico, it dampened the 
already not-excessive enthusiasm for the NAFTA in the USA (refer to Financial Times 5/9/95, 6). On 
the other hand NAFTA could not moderate substantially the depth of the Mexican crisis from 1994 to 
1996. See for a more comprehensive evaluation of the first two years of NAFTA: Anderson/Cavanagh 
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Neoliberalism and Welfare State Structures - A Canadian Perspective of 
the FrA and the NAFT A 
1. Neoliberal Restructuring 
Since the 1980s, neoliberal politics and economics have become a predominant regional and 
global trend. Concurrent with this emerging neoliberal economic emphasis, we have 
witnessed a growing crisis in the tradition al bases and strengths of the welfare state. The 
relations hip between these global - although primarily Western - economic, political and 
social transformations is one that I would like to explore. The welfare state appears to be 
reaching, or has already reached, its "holding capacity" , however this phenomena does not 
exist in isolation from the economic and political context it finds itself in. In fact, it is 
largely a net consequence of these changing global economic and political relationships and 
conditions. In the forefront of this argument are two examples of heoliberalistic endeavours: 
the Canadian - U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), which I likewise refer to as the FTA 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As events of restructuring and 
largely a response to international competitive pressures, the FTA and NAFTA cannot be 
evaluated as isolated elements' of economic transition. Rather , the two free trade agreements 
are only two entities in a multitude and amalgamation of the economic processes which 
have assumed a position of legitimacy in our 11 modern" -day-economy. While I will argue 
that many of the key elements of the NAFTA exacerbate the pressures on the welf are , state 
and contribute to its down-sizing, I do not insinuate that Canada' s participation was 
necessarily avoidable. International and U.S., likewise national neoliberal economic 
transformations and the NAFTA's precursor, the FTA, had already set economic 
prerogatives, which greatly restrict Canada's current economic decision-making in­
dependence. Within this neoliberal economic framework, the NAFTA might be viewed as 
an unavoidable, defensive economic endeavour. Nevertheless, my thesis proposes that this 
neoliberalist trend, likewise within the context of the FTA and the NAFTA is contributing 
to an erosion of many fundamental elements of the welfare state. 
The basic premise of neoliberal politics and economics - which I will refer to as 
"neoliberalisn1" - is that national market economies can prosper indefinitely, providing that 
their structure and development embody the farthest-reaching principles of a privatised and 
deregularised economy. The role of the state in this instance is to provide currency and 
monetary stability in a lawful and orderly society. Govemment intervention is viewed as 
inhibiting market access, free market competition and innovation, and hence preventing the 
fuH realisation of profits. This trend marks a break from govemment interventionist 
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Keynesian-style politics. Governments are turning instead to liberal economic policies in an 
attempt to cut operation and interest costs, which they believe will help secure domestic 
productivity and prosperity in the increasingly competitive world market. Laux explains this 
phenomena: "International competitiveness is the objective, and to reach it they will select 
market driven policies, minimising the direct intrusion of the state in the economy. Not 
only a renewed commitment to trade liberalisation but initiatives to open financial markets 
and deregulate national economies - most dramatically the preparations for a single 
European Market - confirm the trend. Fundamental changes in the world economy, 
captured by the term globalization refers to the reorganisation of production and finance on 
a world-wide scale which has redefined the bases for competition" (Lau x 1990/91, 113­
114). 
Capital mobility, capital markets and financial deregulation are components of global 
economic liberalisation in the move towards post-industrialised societies and economies. 
Together these forces manifest themselves in regional and global trading blocs and 
agreements. Free trade agreements, likewise the Canadian-U.S. FTA, "serve as a 
conditioning institutional framework that prornotes and consolidates neoliberal 
restructuring", namely privatisation and deregulation of the economy (Grinspun and 
Kreklewich 1994, 33). Both domestic and international capital drive this process, forging a 
growing private sector and altering private sector-state relations on anational and 
international basis. 
2. The Role ofthe Welfare State 
The role of the welfare state is to offset potentially negative effects, inequalities or 
economic insecurities of the free market and to redistribute wea1th by providing and 
protecting social policies, which generally incorporate social insurance, public assistance, 
health and welfare services and housing policy (Majone 1993, 158). Social regulation, a 
key component of the welfare state and social policy provides for the regulation and 
maintenance of hea1th and safety, environmental and labour standards as weil as consumer 
protection, likewise as a response to what Majone deerns "market failure" (1993, 157). The 
role of unions and labour movements has traditionally been a backbone of the welfare state, 
and their strength is often a measure of the "quality" of the welf are state, that is, of high 
social standards. The unions are a central aspect of "class compromise" - a key component 
of ·the "social contract" which has charactelised the nature of the relationship between 
economic policy and the social welf are state in the last twenty years. According to 
Robinson, the "quality" of the welfare state likewise determines the quality of democracy 
within astate: "Democracy is unlikely to develop or survive for long in a climate of labour 
repression, because labour rights overlap, to a substantial degree, with human rights and 
denlocratic rights. If we wish to increase the quality of denlocracy we should protect and 
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promote the growth of independent, democratic unions and the other social and economic 
policies that reduce income inequalities" (Robinson 1993, 338). 
In any case, these many factors determine the level of development of the welfare state, and 
allow for great diversity in the scope of welfare states. The NAFTA demonstrates this 
diversity: although all are officially recognised as democratic, Canada is the most 
comprehensive welfare state, the U.S. embodies a less-expansive form, and Mexico 
predominantly lacks these social welf are structures. 
2.1. The V.S. Welfare State 
The U.S. Welf are State, along with the Canadian, is classified by Esping-Anderson as a 
"liberal" welf are state. This type of regime is based on strong "traditional, liberal work­
ethic norms", with the result that programs and benefits are predominantly characterised as 
"modest" and entail stricteligibility criteria for the predominantly low-income, working­
class state dependants whom they cater to (Esping-Anderson 1990, 26). The "liberal" 
welfare state regime is an archetype, which in case-analysis revea1s diversity between 
specific regimes. 
According to Hartrnut Wasser, the U.S. Welfare State is characterised by two themes, the 
first predominant characteristic being "the solving of socio-political problems with a 
concept of private self-responsibility and through private economic organisations". The 
U.S. welfare state tends towards "selectivi(y" because it adheres to the principles of 
individuality, self-responsibility, and "equality of opportunity". The second theme is "the 
existence of wide-spread poverty in the population. This phenomena can be explained by 
the fact that there is no nationally unifornl system for all spheres of social safety in the 
U.S." (Wasser 1991, 159). The lack of a unified system leaves gaps in social security and 
coverage of social programs. 
I have summarised the key social programs of the U.S. Welfare State. The OASDHI (Old­
Age, Survivors, Disability and Hea1th Insurance) program is the largest program and is 
federally operated. It provides protection to workers and their families against loss or 
stoppage of earnings resulting from retirement in old age, death, or disability , and health 
care benefits for beneficiaries 65 and over. The OASDHI is the only universal program, all 
other social programs are subject to means tests, that is, specific coverage criteria. 
Unemployment Insurance (UD covers most employees in private industry and commerce, 
but not agriculture ordomestic workers, nor snlall firms with fewer than four employees. 
The former two programs are financed by payroll taxes. Public Assistance covers old-age 
assistance, aid to the blind, aid to the permanently and totally disabled and aid to families 
with dependent children. Medicaid is a social insurance provided to the poor and medically 
needy who can' t afford voluntary hea1th insurance, and who are receiving Public 
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Assistance. The latter two programs are targeted at society' s needy. A variety of other 
federal/ state programs include, among others, social insurance, student loans and veterans 
compensation. Direct transfer payments to state .and local governments fund education, legal 
aid, social and hea1th services as well as other local services. 
Since the 1970s, these programs have suffered cutbacks due to deregulation and 
privatisation strategies. However, the most notorious and furthest-reaching cutbacks were 
made under the Reagan and Bush .administrations. Spending cuts were made to Public 
Assistance and Medicaid, rules of eligibility were changed, and government positions 
administering these programs were cut. The holes in the U.S. Welfare State have 
consequently become much bigger. In 1988, 35% of all Americans had no hea1th insurance, 
and in 1987, a study concluded that 13 million children under 18 live in poverty, all of this, 
"in the richest country in the world" (Warnock 1988, 152). 
2.2. The Canadian Welfare State 
The Canadian Welf are State, in comparison to the U.S., may also be characterised by two 
general principles, the first of which can be described by the term "Universality", which is 
characterised by the principle of "equality and quality of outcome". Secondly, the Canadian 
Welfare state is comprehensive and unified. The federal government in Ottowa sets 
stringent standards to provide equal terms and conditions for the social programs which are 
generall y regulated and operated by the provincial governments. 
Canada does not have the traditional political foundation of a welf are state based on an 
exceptionally strong labour movement or corporatist modes of policy-making. The labour 
movement in Canada is closely tied to the New Democratic Party - a social democratic 
party - which has never been in power at the national level, although it has been an 
important force in several provinces. In general, unionisation is low, the labour movement 
is divided into various federations, and often divided among provinces and collective 
bargaining is decentralised. However, the establishment of Hea1th Care was the product of a 
social democratic government initiative at the provincial level, which was later adopted 
nationally, demonstrating that social democratic, together with labour forces,do have a 
political voice in Canada. 
The strengths of Canada's welfare state can be characterised by three phenomena, namely 
regional and provincial differences, social movements, and public support. The basis of the 
Canadian Welfare State is territorial, based on regional, provincial and language 
differences. The welfare state is an element of national integration, and is itself reinforced 
by interprovincial and provincial federal bargaining. The legitimacy of regional and 
provincial distinctness means that all regions - whether they are wealthy or poor - are 
included in national coalitions and major political decisions. Individual provinces fight hard 
22 

to maintain critical federal funding of ~rovincial social welfare programs , reinforcing the 
legitimacyof the welf are state at the national level. Social movements, which represent the 
ageing population, women' s movements, as well as native, gay, disabled and welfare 
recipient interests have expanded the legitimacy of equal and SOCiallights. The adoption of 
the Charter of Rights in 1982 likewise strengthened the legitimacy of social issues. Public 
support for social programs is very strong, especially in light of the recession and economic 
insecurity. The welfare state and the concept of universality remain strongly embedded in 
the socio-political values of the population. 
Although Esping-Anderson regards Canada as a "liberal11 welfare state regime, closer 
analysis of specific programs revea1s a dichotomy, as Schiller points out. He makes a 
distinction between two classifications of Canadian social programs: "In the Canadian case, 
a typological division is required: hea1th care politics is laid out as a universal arena of 
I social-democratic I calibre, whereas the complete sphere of income security can be assigned 
to the 'liberal welf are state' category"'(Schiller 1994, 449). Canadian Welfare State 
programs . can be placed in two categories, namely social services and Income Security 
Progran1s. U nder Social Services is Hea1th Care, which is itself provided by two Hea1th 
Insurance programs, namely Hospital Insurance and Medical Care Insurance. Hospital 
Insurance provides financial assistance to provinces for hospital services. Medical Care 
Insurance provides comprehensive coverage for all medically required services rendered by 
a physician or surgeon. Hea1th Care, and likewise Primary and Secondary Education are the 
two Universal Social Services. Selective Social Services include, among others, Child 
Welf are , Child Day Care, Legal Aid, Services to Victims of Violen ce , Indian and Metis 
Friendship Centres, Rehabilitation and Correctional Services, Employment-Related 
Services, Services for People with Special Needs, Horne Care and Housing. 
The following is a list of Income Security Programs. The Canadian Assistance Plan (CAP) 
provides social assistance for the blind, disabled, unemployed or unemployable. Together 
with the provincial welf are programs, it provides a social safety net for the population. The 
Canadian Pension Plan provides income protection in event of retirement, disability or 
death' and is compulsory for most employed and self-employed. The Old Age Security 
(OAS) program is universal and is supplemented with the Guaranteed Income Supplement 
(GIS) and Spouse's Allowance (SPA). It is payable to anyone over age 65 who has filled 
the residency requirements. Unemployment Insurance (ill) provides financial security for 
the unemployed, and is compulsory for most employees. Tax Credits, such as the 
refundable Child Tax Credit, as well as Minimum Wage regulations, Employment Strategy 
and Job Creation provide additional Income Security. As in the U. S., Canadian Social 




3. Neoliberalism and the Welfare State 

In the neoliberalistic global economy, and its ensuing free market and competitive 
pressures, national economic policy is shaped in the following ways: modemisation änd 
innovation initiatives arise, most often in the form of capital intensive technologies and 
investment incentives; reduced govemment intervention in the form of deregulation, 
flexibility and privatisation becomes the norm; attempts are undertaken to lower wage, 
interest and overall economic operational and production costs, which are a component of 
deficitcutting, economic efficientization and rationalisation, and which are largely a driving 
force behind the above-listed policies. These pressure responses replicate themselves in the 
domestic political and social structures. Immense tensions arise as govemments attempt to 
cope with and mediate between the burdensome economic pressures and continuing social, 
welfare and labour demands. Social structures are increasingly adapted to free market 
structures in order to secure national profits. "The goal of the furthest-possible retr~t of the 
state from economic and social politics comprises above all the improvement of the labour 
market's adaptability to economic changes" (Talos 1993, 45). Global emphasis on capital 
markets and capital accumulation has likewise subordinated the political and social elements 
of the state. 
In the 1970s, rapidly growing capital accumulation through capital investments resulted in 
high capital intensity. Subsequent lower capital productivity and a significant increase in 
capital costs was aggravated by high interest rates in the 1980s. In an effort to reduce 
capital pressures, management placed pressure instead on labour costs. If individual wages 
could not be cut, a "flexibility" strategy for reducing overall wage costs was implemented: 
work intensification and work reduction resulted in a rising demand for the part -time labour 
market. Part-time work has the effect of reducing social benefits and earning capacities of 
employees. Capital intensive production involves adeparture from traditional industrial 
labour-intensive production. The result is a loss of jobs in the industrial sector , which is 
expected to be offset by growing employment opportunities in the service sector . 
Employees fortunate enough to find jobs in the service sector could, and still can, expect a 
reduction in wages. However, general economic stagnation has prevented the service sector 
from being able to absorb this freed labour force, and therefore unemployment has grown 
drastically. High unemployment levels in turn burden the already overstretched capacities of 
the social system, therefore intensifying the welfare state crisis. High unemployment 
creates a large labour pool, which leaves those who are employed, and labour unions 
overall, with a weaker bargaining position with management for wages and benefits. 
Essentia11y, welfare states 'govemments' abilities to a11eviate these negative free market 
side effects through social policy and regulation, become overtaxed. Bieling sums up this 
political shortcoming: "Likewise implied is a changed economic and political relationship: 
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the globalized market relationships require merely a political regulation that is subordinate 
to capital movements" (Bieling 1994, 25). 
Global competitiveness can in some instances lead to the phenomena of "social dumping" 
made possible by the "liberalisation" - free movement - of trade, investment and workers 
across borders. In order to undercut competitors, corporations "relocate to low-social-wage 
areas, or pressure their governnlents to reduce social wage costs. In extreme scenarios, 
these actions could fuel a downward spiral in social provision, eventually producing very 
rudimentary 'lowest common denonlinator' national welfare states" (Leibfried and Pierson 
1992, 349). In order to overcome the "competitive disadvantage" of the welfare state within 
the neoliberal global economy, firms push for social-labour concessions which both directly 
and indirectly contribute to a dismantling of the social structure, although not necessarily to 
the "lowest conlmon denominator" : A general weakening of trade unions and trade union 
rights is a result of pressures to accept wage cuts and worsening work conditions; 
tendencies towards contribution-based social services, as opposed to universal coverage, is 
growing as governments are pressured to withdraw from social and employment regulation. 
"Social spending is measured against other fiscal-political alternatives and is subsequently 
subordinated. In this sense, the social state also becomes too expensive ( ... ) now seen only 
as a competitive obstacle" (Bultemeier 1994, 124). 
Corporations have been able to reprioritise and redefine the contexts of contemporary 
legislative agendas favouring international competitive trading considerations over that of 
traditionally government supported social welfare policies. In light of this level of corporate 
pressure on governments, the structure and interests of these corporations are worth 
examining. Corporations and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are top-down power 
structures, which means that labour interests are inherently isolated from that of top 
corporate management. In addition to this top-down power structure, many of the decisions 
made by MNCs are determined by the stockholders-investors who are geographically 
isolated from the ramifications of their decisions.~ Not only are the shareholder-investors not 
liable for the ramifications of their decisions, they do not have to legitimise their corporate 
agendas to the public; this legitimisation, within the current neoliberal trend, is the role of 
the government. Governments, from this perspective, are supposed to smooth the way for 
MNC activities by absorbing the cost of social dumping and legitimising their activities by 
proclaiming MNC interests as the interests of the nation. Likewise, the assumptioll arises 
that corporate profits, and therefore corporate welfare is synonymous with the welf are of 
the nation as a whole. This, however, is only true, insofar as certain structures are in place 
within astate, which are effective in redistributing these profits - national wealth - and 
offsetting negative consequences of free market policy (i.e. social dumping). Because the 
expanse of the govemment's role as protector of the welfare state against perceived 
inequalities of free market polices is being eclipsed by government I s increasing role as 
legitimisers of corporate-driven neoliberal policies, they are less and less able to redistribute 
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national wea1th. Therefore, corporate wea1th and corporate interests are not necessarily syn­
onymous with the welf are , wea1th and interests of the population within any given state, 
and this in turn can lead to a discongruence of corporate interests and national welfare 
interests. 
Integral to the understanding of corporate-driven neoliberalism is the understanding of the 
role of economic elites in this process, since multinational corporate executives, investors 
and shareholders together form part of a network of national and international economic 
elites, whose interests tend to overlap. Grinspun and Kreklewich (1994, 34) charge that 
neoliberalism-driven restructuring is itself an elite-driven, undemocratic tool used to further 
personal economic interests, at the expense of social welfare policies.Domestic and 
international elites, including many forms of national capital, work together to support free 
trade agreements: "conditioning frameworks, although apparently championed by 
'domestic' elites, are actively promoted by the transnational capitalist class. The 
conditioning mechanism will 'level the playing field' by shaping public policies according 
to the needs of that class; it creates an effective transnational policy guide and enforcement 
mechanism" (Grinspun and Kreklewich 1994, 49). 
FTAs are primarily "conditioning frameworks" for concretising neoliberalist economic 
policies on a regional and global scale. They have the effect of transferring a great dea1 of 
economic and political influence and decision-making powers from government regulatory 
bodies to the corporate and elite sectors - that is, the private sector . Conditioning 
frameworks bind governments to a set of neoliberal constraints, effectively negating many 
of their economic decision-making sovereignties, and in fact securing compliance of social 
and labour standards to these economic prerogatives. Grinspun and Kreklewich (1994, 51) 
profess that "theoutcome [of the promotion and consolidation of neoliberalist restructuring 
through 'conditioning frameworks'], if unchallenged, will be a narrower set of societal 
choices; an unprecedented entrenchment of barriers to progressive social change". 
3.1. The NAFTA in North America 
" 
Mexico' s earlier attempts to embark on economic modernisation and liberalisation involved 
a bilateral free market dea1 withthe U. S., to set up the Maquiladora Industries commonly 
known as "export production zones" - in the latter half of the 1960s. Although this deal was 
to set the tone for further free trade arrangen1ents with the U.S., it was not until the 1980s 
that Mexico altered its predominantly protectionist policies to fully embrace neoliberalism. 
In an attempt to combat entrenched economic crises, the Mexican government, under the 
direction of neoliberalist Carlos Salinas de Gortari, embarked on an economic strategy of 
liberalisation and deregulation. Import substitution industrialisation was deferred for export 
diversification orientation policies which included encouraging free trade, foreign 
26 

investment, undertaking the privatisation of state industry and restrictive wage policies, and 
forging" ever-closer economic links with the U.S. 
A precursor to the NAFTA was, as already mentioned, the establishnlent of the 
Maquiladora export-production industries in Mexico. The result of this attempt to secure 
employment for Mexican workers, earn foreign currency and foster a transfer of 
technology, is perhaps one of the most blatant neoliberal policy failures to date. Because 
production involves U.S.-inputs, is controlled by U.S. fums and finished products 
subsequently leave Mexico in U.S. hands, Mexico itself realises minimal, if any profits, 
investment benefits or technology transfers. Employment conditions are , simply put, 
exploitive: little or no job security, bare-subsistence wages, no social, labour or 
environmental regulations, and therefore a health-threatening environment and extreme 
poverty levels. The Mexican government's acceptance of such conditions in the· 
Maquiladora industries exhibits a disregard for overall social, labour and environnlental 
issues. The uprising in the Chiapas (Mexico) was a response to, and likewise illustrates, the 
exploitive social political and economic conditions. In the context of these exploitive, yet 
from the corporate perspective "optimal" labour-cost conditions, the issue of social dumping 
becomes not only a distinct possibility, but a reality. The cheap Mexican labour supply has 
encouraged U. S. firms to pull out of U. S. production sites in favour of more economical 
Mexican production sites, exacerbating U.S. unemployment levels. 
The recent $50 billion bailout of Mexico calls into question the overall economic and social 
suitabilityand stability of Mexico within the NAFTA. "As the panic of the last few weeks 
recedes, what nlany have come to realise is that Mexico, once billed as a model of free­
market reform,had in fact become a case study in economic recklessness in the last few 
years" (Hirsch 1995, 17). The U.S. footed $20 billion of the bailout sum, an action which 
adds to fears that the costs of Mexico' s economic and social instability will be born by 
American and Canadian economies-- which would add additional financial pressures to their 
respective economies and social structures. 
The U.S., for its own part, has largely directed liberalist, free-market global trends since 
World War 11. A greater level of domestic protectionism has coexisted along with this 
liberal foreign economic policy, markedly since the emergence of signs of waning U.S. 
economic hegemony. From an American perspective,. the NAFT A can be viewed as a 
complementary regional component of its other international liberal market strategies, 
which emerge in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Pacific Rim 
agreements. By signing its fust regional trading-bloc deal, namely the NAFTA, the U.S. is 
attempting to recapture, redefme and sttengthen its world economic position. "The NAFTA 
must be judged in this eontext as an attempt by the (former) hegemonie USA. to redefine its 
position in the world economy" (Lavon 1994, 25). The U.S. has played the eentral role in 
the bargaining and consolidating processes of the NAFTA, and without a doubt stands to 
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dominate the trading bloc due to its eeonomic and military might as well as its sheer 
dominance of population within the region. Betting on the betterment of these strengths, the 
NAFTA is expected to enhance both U.S. and North American competitive abilities, 
espeeially in relation to the EU and Japan. 
3.2. The FTA in Canada 
Canada has had a history of eeonomic dependence on the United States. In 1940 40 % of 
Canada's trade was with the United States (Buckley 1994, 383). Since then, trade has 
steadily increased, albeit with fluctuations. In the 1990s, this percentage was at about 
75.8% and the U.S. import percentage at 62.,3% (International Monetary Fund, 1992). The 
1965 Canadian-U.S. Autopact drew special attention due to Canadian eeonomic gains, 
namely increased employment in the Auto industry and increased auto exports to the United 
States, which helped Canada attain an overall trade surplus with the U.S. 
However, Canada's eeonomic reeord has not been all positive, espeeially in recent years. 
An eeonomy based on natural resources and the export of relatively unrefined commodities, 
which accounts for 55% of all exports (Cohen 1992, 20), combined with proteetionist 
economic policies and low productivity growth, have left Canada ill-equipped to compete 
effectively in the neoliberal world market. Canada exports 1/3 of its produce (Banting 
1992, 151), which accounts for 40 % of its GDP (Charest 1992/93, 121), and is therefore 
vulnerable to changes in a global eeonomy over which it has little in fluen ce. Exacerbating 
this vulnerability has been Canada's increasing eeonomic dependency on the U.S., not only 
in terms of trade, but in direct ownership as weIl. When free trade first became an issue, 
"about 50 percent of the manufacturing seetor, 45 percent of petroleum and natural gas, 40 
percent of mining and smelting and 26 percent of all other industries were owned or 
controlled by foreign (mostly U.S.) fums" (Cohen 1992, 18). 
In the early 1980s, the economic reeession hit Canada particularly hard beeause of its 
internal economic weaknesses. Average incomes deelined and unemployment rose to 12 % 
nationally, but was as high as 20 % in the poorer regions (Banting 1992, 151). Economic 
reeession and growing deficit pressures prompted a review of economic and trade policies. 
In 1984, the e1ection of a Conservative government 1ed by Brian Mu1roney set the tone for 
a shift towards neoliberal eeonomic policies, which included strategies for deficit reduction, 
tax reform and international competitiveness. The Conservative government tended towards 
seleetivity, as opposed to universality of social programs. Although unemployment, pension 
and hea1thcare demands have increased social spending, further program development has 
largely been abandoned and many social benefits have been eroded. For example, the 
Family Allowance Program, which provided monthly payments on behalf of children under 
18 was tern1inated, the Universality of the Old Age Seeurity plan was abolished, and,federal 
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contribution to the Unemployment Insurance program was ended, and payments have been 
restricted (Rice and Prince 1993, 382). 
Overall, program spending was constrained, frozen or reduced in social housing, legal aid, 
hea1th care, social assistance and post-secondary education. However, a "stea1th style" of 
social policy reform prevented close media scrutiny, and kept the public unaware of the 
extent of the reforms, therefore preventing widespread unpopularity. Tax increases have 
been another component of restructuring, and have gradually become less-progressive. Such 
tax reforms and increases have sparked resistance from the population, which has 
increasingly engaged in black-market activities and cross-border shopping in the United 
States in protest. 
Welf are state restructuring and economic and tax reform have not been successful in 
alleviating Canada' s economic or social problems. In fact, the neoliberal overtone of the 
1980s regressed many social and labour standards, as weH as polarised income levels, since 
many corporations introduced low-wage strategies and pressured unions into concessionary 
bargaining. "In our view, the most significant consequences of the Conservatives' social 
policy record have been a lowering of the safety net and a weakening of the bonds of 
nationhood. Several Canadian social programs have become more like those of the United 
States: child benefits, drug patent legislation, elderly benefits and unemployment insurance 
(...) the Mulroney government's policy agenda has moved Canadian social policy closer to 
the American system. Whether or not this policy pattern is due to the Free Trade 
Agreement, the results point to a trend towards harmonisation between Canada and the 
United States in key elements of social policy" (Rice and Prince 1993, 384). 
This process of reform, with its neoliberal overtones, was simultaneously the driving force 
behind Canada's participation in the 1989 Free Trade Agreement (FTA /CUFTA). Four 
points characterise· Canada's decision to enter the FTA. First of aH, the FTA was an 
opportunity to concretise the process of economic restructuring that the Conservative 
governmenthad led throughout the 1980s. Secondly, the FTA was viewed as a means by 
which to improve Canadian international competitiveness, a key theme of the Conservative 
government. An additional concern was the level of protectionism that had developed in the 
U.S. in the 1970s. It was hoped that a FTA would compensate for this protectionism by 
securing Canadian access to the U.S. market. Finally, access to this larger market was 
expected to help Canada rea1ise economies of scale and increase access to high-technology. 
In short, Canada's participation in the FTA was a "realist political" (Winham 1994, 492) 
response to trade and economic dependence on one country, namely the U. S .. However, by 
signing the FTA, hence binding itself legally to a set of economic requirements, Canada has 
intensified its economic dependency on the U. S .. 
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3.3. The Canadian Free Trade Debate: From the FTA to the NAFTA 
The FT A debate saw alignments develop primarily along political party lines, in business­
labour-special interest groups, and among various provinces and regions. Mulroney's 
Progressive Conservative (PC) party was naturally the largest proponent of free trade, 
including most of its party members and supporters. The Liberal Party, likewise a centrist­
although slightly more left-leaning party did not support the NAFTA. However, the 
Liberal Party did not represent as united· a front on the issue as the PCs did, a prime 
example being the Liberal Premier of Quebec, Bourassa, who supported free trade.The 
Liberal Party' s initial position in 1987, before negotiations were formalised, "was a 
compromise between the party' s anti -free trade wing and a smaller wing sympathetic to free 
trade" (Doern and Tomlin 1991, 231). As well, party supporters were less-consistently free 
trade opponents than were PC supporters pro-free traders. The smaUer, labour-based New 
. Democratic Party (NDP) forcefully opposed the FTA, and its supporters were likewise 
predominantly opposed to free trade. When the 1988 election became a Free Trade election, 
these partyaffiliations played a central role in the heated debate: The PCs being confronted 
by the adamant Liberals and NDPs. 
Much incentive for Canada's freetrade negotiations came from the major business organisa­
tions, which likewise comprised the major support base for the FTA. The most prominent 
among these groups are the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) , the Canadian 
Manufacturing Association (CMA) , the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) and the 
Canadian Bankers Association (CBA). The chief voice of big Canadian business and of 
course a major free trade proponent is the Fraser Institute. The Canadian Federation of 
Independent Business (CFIB), which represents smaller-sized businesses, likewise supported 
Free Trade, although 20 % of its membership opposed the FTA and 14 % were undecided 
(Warnock 1988, 115). These groups were likewise joined by many other trade associations 
throughout Canada as well as the mass media and major Newspaper chains such as The 
Financial Post, The Financial Times and the Toronto Globe and Mail (Ibid., 116and 120) 
and the Consumer Association of Canada (CAC). Several national "think tanks", among 
them the Institute for Research on Public Policy and the Econonlic Council of Canada 
(ECC), were enthusiastic supporters of free trade and the FTA. 
This list of groups supporting free trade, which are predominantly - in fact, almost 
exclusively - comprised of big business interests, i11ustrates the degree of socio-economic 
polarisation of the issue. If one looks at the contra-side of the debate, one sees a much more 
diverse group öf interests being represented. The most predominant dissenters were labour 
groups, the Canadian Labour Congress for example, women' s groups such as the National 
Action Committee on the Status of Women, agricultural groups such as the National and 
Quebec Farmers Unions, Church groups, environmental groups and the arts/cultural 
community, including the Writers' and Artists Unions of Canada. Native dissent was voiced 
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through the Assembly of First Nations. Senior citizens' organisations, teacher' s federations, 
anti-poverty groups and peace networks likewise voiced opposition. Many of these groups 
coalesced into the Action Canada Network (ACN), formerly the Pro-Canada Network. The 
most predominant anti-free trade organisers in this Network were the women's movement, 
environmentalists, labour and the churches. An intense level of activism on behalf of these 
groups gave momentum to the anti-free trade campaign. 
Provincial and regional alignments provided for another predominant split in the FTA 
debate.· Three of the four western provincial governments, namely, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, were the earliest and strongest supporters of the FTA 
initiative. The fourth, Alberta remained strongly opposed. According to polIs, the 
populations in western Canada were the strongest supports of free trade, with the percentage 
of support for free trade at 66%, and for the FTA at 42 % in Decerrlber 1987 (Dasko 1988, 
252). The Quebec provincial government was another strong FTA suppolier, and its 
population the second most supportive in Canada. Figures show Quebec popular support for 
free trade at 58% and for the FTA at 47% in December, 1987 (Ibid., 252). Atlantic Canada 
popular support for free trade followed at 57 % and for the FT A at 45 % during the same 
time period (Ibid., 252). The Atlantic provincial governments were overall supportive of 
the FTA, although less enthusiastic and less concerned about their inclusion in the free trade 
bargaining process. The Ontario provincial government was by far the most vocal 
provincial/regional opponent of the FTA. Likewise its population expressed the highest 
regional dissent in Canada, with 50% supporting free trade but only 32 % supporting the 
FTA; a larger number, 46% disagreed with the NAFTA (Ibid., 252). Provincial gov­
ernment support or dissent was dependent on various factors, among them regional 
diversity. Perhaps most notably, the economic diversity between provinces and regions 
dictated the provincial government agendas. The business community in Quebec, for 
example was a strong proponent of free trade and played a key role in influencing Johnson I s 
Liberal government to support free . trade. On the other hand, party affiliation of the 
provincial govenlments was another influential factor in deternlining provincial support or 
dissent of free trade, the FTA and the NAFTA. 
Other demographic factors had significantly less impact on the personal opinions of the 
Canadian population. Most significantly, union members, blue-colIar workers and lower­
income groups were the least supportive of the FTA (Dasko 1986, 29). High-income, 
highly educated groups, on the other hand, tend to be strongly supportive (Dasko 1988, 251 
and 253). Men tended to be more suppottive of free trade, whereas women, especialIy those 
in the labour force, tended to be less supportive (Ibid., 257). Age, on the other hand, 
played very little role in FTA opinion polIs. According to polls in December 1987, 57% of 
Canadians supported free trade, 32 % did not support free trade, and 10% expressed no 
·opinion; referring specifically to the FTA, 40% voiced support, 39% voiced dissent, and 
21 % had no opinion (Ibid., 252). However, in November 1988, during the heated free 
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trade election campaign, public opposition to the FTA had grown to 53% (Clarke 1992, 
120). Later, in 1992, poIls showed that 66% were opposed to the FTA (Winham 1994, 
493). 
The major issues of the free trade debate concerned the strength of the Canadian economy, 
fears of unemployment and a loss of cultural identity and political independence. February 
1986 statistics show that 46 % of the population believed that free trade would strengthen 
the Canadian economy and that 36 % disagreed with this statement; 43 % believed the result 
would be higher unemployment and 38% disagreed (Dasko 1986, 32). Canadians also 
generally believed that free trade would result in lower consumer prices. Rowever, 
although economics would appear to be the central issue in a free trade debate, cultural and 
political views and issues proved to be just as crucial. In the same 1986 survey, 38 % of 
Canadians believed free trade would lead to an erosion of Canada' s cultural identity, while 
40% believed Canadian political independence would suffer (Dasko 1986, 32). The pro­
FTA camp was upset that social policy issues were brought into an economic debate about 
trade policy. Likewise, they believed the public to be ignorant of the already-prevalent 
limitations on Canada's decision-making independence. Anti-free traders felt, on the other 
hand, that pro-free traders - and primarily big business - were prioritising private economic 
gains over the political and social well-being of the Canadian public. 
Both supporters and dissenters of the FTA conjured up nationalistic visions of Canada to 
portray their arguments regarding these economic and cultural/political issues. "The free 
trade debate saw the emergence in stark form of two distinct brands of nationalism. One 
was centred in the anti-free trade forces, founded on a defence of the powers of the 
Canadian state as the crucial glue for Canada' s unity and independence. The other brand 
was a nationalism based on the market in which the pro-free trade coalition asserted a new 
entrepreneurial confidence in the ability of Canadians to compete with the best in the 
world" (Doern/Tomlin 1991, 206). 
The FTA debate polarised into these two camps, each perplexed and distressed at the 
other's nationalistic and emotional-based arguments and manipulation of economic and 
unemployment statistics. In short, "the public debate over free trade was a maddening 
mixture of competing facts and values that produced alternative visions in Canada" (Ibid., 
222). The heated debate finally came to its "official" end· when Mulroney' s PC party won a 
majority in the Canadian parliament. This was viewed by the Conservative govemment to 
be the public legitimisation required to go ahead with the FTA. Because the PCs had won 
58% of the seats in the Rouse of Commons, the Liberal and NDP parties which had pushed 
for an election on the free trade issue, accepted this claim of legitimacy. However, other 
opponents of the FTA pointed out that although the peS had won a majority of the seats, 
they had only received 43 % of the electorate vote, due to distortions of the first-past-the­
post electoral system. Likewise, they argued that because 50 % of the electorate had voted 
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for the two anti-free trade parties, the PC govemment did not have the public legitimacy it 
needed for the FTA. Regardless of these criticisms, the election results stood, and the FT A 
became operation al on January 1, 1989. 
Essentially, the FTA regulates the flow of all trade, goods, services and investment, 
eliminating most tariff and non-tariff barriers (see Appendix a). The NAFTA (see Appendix 
b) is basically a reconfirmation of the FTA provisions. However, elaborations were made to 
the investment and telecommunications clauses, national treatment and border measure 
considerations were reorganised, and intellectual property and competition policy 
stipulations were added. Tacked on to this core document was a list of national reservations 
and exceptions in the newly added areas of investment, services and financial services. If 
other" countries are to be included in the NAFTA, the core document will remain fixed, 
with modifications cited in the "added-on" list. 
Unlike the FTA, Canada's participation in the NAFTA was viewed largely as a defensive 
measure to protect the preferential status that Canada received in the U. S. market through 
the FTA, and to prevent the D.S: from obtaining a trading advantage in relation to Canada 
and Mexico. However, other considerations also played a role in Canada's decision to enter 
NAFTA negotiations. NAFTA's greater comprehensiveness was expected to cover a larger 
range of Canadian trading interests. Canada also hoped to improve some aspects of the FTA 
which were considered problematic (for example, provide more predictable practices and 
rules for customs rules and administration, establish a more effective binational dispute 
settlement process, and dea1 with the issue of U.S: anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
laws which were viewed as non-tariff barriers). Finally, Canada hoped to gain better access 
to the Mexican market, and to expand its trade relationships. 
However, optimistic predictions for the NAFTA were tainted by the perceived negative 
experiences with the FTA. Many blame the FTA for the Canadian economic recession, 
which has been the severest economic downturn since the 1930s. The unemployment rate 
reached its highest point in eight years, at 11.6 % in 1992, and federal unemployment 
insurance payments reached its highest sum ever, at $5.7 billion (Maclean's Aug. 24, 1992, 
45). Plant closures and the loss of 461,000 manufacturing jobs contributed notably to 
unemployment rates (Maclean's Aug. 24, 1992, 48). Overall, the Canadian manufacturing 
sector lost, proportionally, four times as many jobs as the U. S. manufacturing sector since 
1989 (Campbell 1994, 154), an indication of where the Canadian jobs have moved to. 
Although the manufacturing sector was most predominately hard-hit, agriculture has been 
another sector adversely affected. Fruit and vegetable farmers have particularly suffered 
losses due to increased competition, for" example grape growers have also seen their 
industry destroyed as a result of free trade. In Ontario, 40 percent of the vineyards have 
been ripped up, and 70 percent of B.C. 's are gone. Many of the current unemployed are 
facing difficulties finding work, even after having participated in retraining programs, a . 
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sign that new job opportunities are not being created in any significant number elsewhere in 
the economy to offset unemployment levels. Many find themselves working part-time when 
full-time employment is not available. Those still employed face added pressures to accept 
concessions and fewer employment benefits and wage increases. The long-standing trend of 
employment income polarisation has been likewise exac~rbated. These economic realities 
provided am munition for a contra-free trade position in the ensuing NAFTA debate. 
The NAFTA was signed by the Bush and Mulroney administrations, but faced heated debate 
and a battle for ratification in the respective Senate and parliament. The political alignments 
regarding the Canadian NAFTA debate were essentially those of the FTA debate, with 
however, the popular support for free trade significantly lower. The NDP party was once 
again most vehemently opposed, the Liberal party was less adamantly opposed than on the 
FTA debate, and the PCs naturally championed the deal. Ontario once again opposed the 
NAFTA negotiations, whereas Quebec, the two Western provinces of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan and the Atlantic provinces were the most supportive. The polarisation of the 
issue between big business and labour was likewise predominant in the NAFTA debate. The 
NAFT A was greeted with outright opposition from most labour unions, environmental 
groups and much of the public. Less than 50 % of the public voiced support for the NAFT A 
and 64 % were against a regional trading bloc in 1992 (Winham 1994, 493), due largely to 
the notorious shortcomings of the FT A. 
Many of the FTA supporters, big business for example, have assumed a defensive stance, 
as opposed to an optimistic or confident stance to free trade, in light of the economic and 
employment problems Canada faced following the enactment of the FTA. Although big 
business was predominantly pro-NAFTA, as they had been pro-FTA, the membership of 
the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, which represents sma1l and medium-sized 
Canadian firms, was split on the issue. Several firms and industries which had been hit hard 
by adjustments under the FTA were more hesitant about supporting the NAFTA, among 
them the furniture, shoe and garment industries. 
The Liberal Party of Canada, which had previously opposed the FTA, re-evaluated its free 
trade position concerning the NAFTA. During his 1993 election campaign, Liberal Party 
leader, Jean Chretien promised to renegotiate the NAFTA to deal with the issues of 
environmental and labour standards, energy exports, and the way that the agreement deals 
with subsidies and dumping (this refers to the pricing of exported goods at a less than fair 
selling price at horne). After assuming power, Chretien negotiated three side-deals 
concerning subsidies and dumping, fresh-water exports and energyresources. However, the 
general consensus confirms that these side-dea1s will be ineffective. Maclean' s Magazine 
(Dec. 13, 1993, 14) summed up Chretients efforts: ttlronica1ly, the Liberalts greatest 
triumph may have been in getting opponents and supporters of NAFTA alike to agree on 
one point: the side deals are meaningless tt. The Liberal Party has since issued statements 
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supporting global trade-liberalisation, and have expressed an interest in widening the 
NAFTA. Chile is expected to enter the NAFTA in 1996. 
4. NAFT A: A Critique 
The very conditions under which NAFTA was negotiated, promoted and passed, call into 
question the legitimacy of concem paid to social, welfare and labour organisations and 
issues. The political elites who ratified the NAFTA took their cues from the influences of 
the economic elites. Neither the unions, nor environmental and other alternative interest 
groups, nor the general populations of each of the three countries were consulted in the 
NAFTA's ratification. Pro-NAFTA lobby expenditures far outweighed and effectively 
silenced that of their anti-NAFTA counterparts, most predominantly the unions, 
environnlental and consumer organisations. The Mexican govemment conducted the longest 
and most expensive foreign lobby campaign ever seen in the U.S. (Lavon 1994, 70). U.S. 
corporations likewise jumped on the bandwagon to secure their access to the cheap Mexican 
workforce and Mexican consumer market. Together, "Mexico and 'Big Business USA' 
bought NAFTA" (Lavon 1994, 73). Clearly thisprocess has made evident the primary 
interests behind the NAFTA - the neoliberal corporate agenda - and foreshadows who its 
major beneficiaries will be. 
The "winners" so far have certainly not been the advocates of' social, labour and 
environmental regulations. Although social provisions were mentioned in the NAFTA, 
standards were not guaranteed, neither were these goals concretised or legitimised. Rather , 
recommendations were made to the effect that each country should maintain health, safety 
and environmental standards. More comprehensive considerations were deferred to follow­
up side-deals by the NAFTA negotiators, which to date have not filled this "social concem" 
gap. The NAFTA makes reference to basic human, animal, hea1th, environment and 
consumer regulatory objectives, in the context of legitimate trade restrictions. A 
govemment defending acharge of restricting trade must prove its intent was the realisation 
of one of these objectives, and must likewise demonstrate what Robinson (1993, 341) 
describes: "That its measure was the 'least trade restrictive necessary' to ac hieve its 
legitimate objective ( ...) The least trade restrictive way to achieve the objective may be 
much more expensive, less effective, or have many undesirable side-effects. Why should all 
other policy objectives - even those acknowledged to be "legitimate" - be subordinated to 
the objective of freeing the movement of goods, services and investments across borders?" . 
Trade dispute resolution panels are to meet behind closed doors to pass judgement on 
charges of trade restriction,' without being required to consult with scientific and 
environmental experts. "NAFT A dispute resolution panels will be able to overrule laws 
passed by democratic pro ces ses 11 if they consider these laws to be 11 illegal trade barriers 11 
(Greens/Green Party USA 1993, 2). Furthermore, "a corporation may challenge a law if it 
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thinks the law caused it economic loss, even if the law did not violate a NAFTA provision. 
A member country can bring cases against measures that do not violate NAFTA roles, but 
that cause it to miss an economic opportunity it 'could reasonably have expected to accroe 
to it'" (Greens/Green Party USA 1993, 2). This ordering of economic over social, labour 
and environmental priorities i1lustrates once again the level of risk that the welfare state and 
trade unions have been placed under. The fact that unions are not internationally operative 
associations leaves them likewise sub ordinate to broader power-based corporations who can 
take advantage of these liberal trade provisions. 
Rather than facilitating the co-operation of unions and workers in Canada, Mexico and the 
U.S., the NAFTA intensifies the competition between them. This "whipsawing" effect 
(Lavon 1994, 82), threatens workers. in Canada and the U.S., who find themselves in 
competition with Mexico's low wage and social-wage corporate "haven". Unions are forced 
into "concessionary bargaining" (Ibid., 107), through which they are pressured to accept 
lower wages, benefits and declining working conditions. Over aperiod of time, continual 
concessionary bargaining and competition weakens union cohesion, leading to a 
fragmentation which in turn reduces union bargaining power even more, and exacerbates 
already declining wages and working conditions. In more extreme cases, where unions are 
significantly weakened, a policy of "union busting" (Ibid., 107) becomes predonlinant. 
Already declinillg union concentration and power, due to a shifting economic base from 
industrial, labour intensive production to non-Iabour and non-union based service sector 
employment, has delegitimised· many aspects of labour-based social welfare policies. This 
shift has in turn been intensified by simultaneously adopted neoliberal policies, which 
together have eroded the base of support for social welfare policies, therefore facilitating 
union busting policies. Robinson refers to a process by which the governments of Reagan 
and Bush, in responding to international competition, supported anti-union policies which 
made it possible for U.S. employers to cut wages and workers benefits. "American em­
ployer violations of labour laws and regulations increased as union density and labour 
movement power fell" (Robinson 1993, 349-350). Under the directives of the NAFTA and 
the subsequently increased competitive pressures with Mexico, this process will likely be 
intensified. A union representative in Mexico phrases it this way: "The Free Trade 
Agreement is a form of blackmail against workers ( ... ) It is a way of blackmailing workers 
. to continue to accept miserable working conditions in order to have jobs" (Cueva 1992, 
187). Canadian unions which tend to be stronger than American unions, have had more 
success at resisting "concessionary" and "union busting" pressures. However, the negative 
effect of this resistance has been higher levels of Canadian unemployment, due to 
employers carrying out their "blackmail" threats by closing plants and moving 
manufacturing activities to the U.S. and Mexico. 
What would appear to be positive employment effects - higher employment figures - for 
Mexico, as a result of manufacturing operations being established within its borders, are 
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offset by population growth rates which keep the rate of unemployment steady. In addition, 
the ease with which the U.S. can now flood the Mexican market with its cheap agriculture 
exports, is expected to displace Mexico's agriculturally employed. Displaced rural workers 
gravitate towards the cities in hopes of finding employment, and in turn exacerbate 
unemployment levels in the cities. Non-agricultural industries may find themselves likewise 
driven out of competition by stronger foreign corporations which now have greater access 
to the Mexican domestic market, the net effect being higher overall employment levels. 
Growing unemployment in turnweakens union bargaining power even further, therefore 
eroding labour standards and social benefits (if present in the first place). It appears that the 
Mexican government's hopes of entering the "First World" through the NAFTA won't be 
rea1ised in the near future, if at all , judging from the already socially destabilising side­
effects of neoliberal policy. "Mexico' sentrance into the NAFTA is one more damaging step 
in a decade-old process of handing our human and natural resources over to transnational 
capital. Neo-liberal policies have changed people's lives, producing growing 
unemployment, poverty, reduced access to hea1thcare and education, growing hunger and 
malnutrition, more children dying ( ...) These are the daily consequences of neoliberal 
economicpolicies for 50 million Mexican" (Alvarez/Mendoza 1992, 34). 
Whereas these basic social and labour standards have not been protected in NAFTA - in 
fact, they appear to be on the decline - property rights have been, as Robinson (1993, 339) 
points out: n expanded proteetions for investor property rights stand in stark contrast to the 
absence of measures to increase the proteetion of labour rights and the environment". These 
private property rights enhance the ability of corporations to push their interests to the fore­
front of government policy, prioritising them above social and labour interests. 
Governments are now legally more restricted from regulating corporate behaviour. 
Increased investment security in Mexico increases economic pressures in Canada and the 
U.S. to deregulate to remain more competitive and attractive to capital investment. These 
investor property rights apply equally to national and international corporations on the 
North American continent. The subsequent fusion of national and international corporate 
interests, and hence power, increases the political and economic influence over governments 
constrained by the neoliberal structuring of the NAFTA. Unfortunately these presence of 
these power relations leads to the question of who "winst! and who "loses" in NAFTA. 
Chomsky (1994, 64-65) formulates his answer to this question: t!They [the New York 
Times, K.H.] said that finances and services will be particularly big winners. Banks, 
investment firms, PR firms, corporate law firms will do just great. Some manufacturers 
will also benefit - for example, publishing and the chemica1 industry which is highly 
capital-intensive, with not many workers to worry about. Then they said, well there'll be 
some losers too: women, Hispanies and other minorities, and semi-skilled workers - in 
other words, about two-thirds of the work forcen. 
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The"winners" belong to the very same economic elite that lobbied to silence the voices of 
the potential "losers", and that continue to advocate neoliberal economic policies which 
push for social and labour deregulation. The very fact that it is possible to draw such a clear 
distinction between "winners" and "losers", gives evidence to growing social and economic 
polarisation within the economies. One of the central functions of the welfare state, to 
redistribute wea1th in a way which prevents high levels of economic and social polarisation, 
has proven itself to be transparent and on the decline. Seen in this context, it appears that 
the welfare state is losing legitimacy to the more powerful neoliberal economic demands. 
In comparison, EC citizens are fortunate. They have at least some minimum social 
standards with which to protect themselves and their welfare states from what amount to 
"attacks" on their social, welfare and labour fundaments. Their North American 
counterparts have not been afforded the same protection. This is not to say that the 
Canadian and American welf are states will disintegrate, but rather that they are more 
exposed to the pressures of the neoliberal economic agenda, which could serve to erode the 
legitimisation and fundamentals of the social welfare state. 
5. Conclusion 
There is no denying the social welf are drawbacks of unchecked neoliberal economic 
policies; likewise there is no denying the heavy pressures and often crisis proportions that 
have manifested themselves within the Western Welf are State: unemployment, sinking real 
wages and social benefits, social cost-cutting, etc - in short, social dumping. The fate of the 
welfare state is by no means secured, either positively or negatively, but the current trend 
sees many of its tradition al bases being eroded. "They" say that we can no longer afford the 
welfare state in its current expanse and that we must deregulate, internationalise, 
modernise, capitalise, and cut "operational" costs to remain competitive. "They" are the 
ones who are the "winners" of neoliberal initiatives such as the NAFTA and the Common 
Market. The "operational" costs that are being cut are the livelihoods of the workers within 
these countries - that is, these "losers" are the citizens. From a neoliberal standpoint, these 
losses are worth the economic competitiveness, and hence profits, that will be gained - but 
who sees these profits? In a society where the welfare state is being dismantled so that it can 
less and less effectively redistribute this wealth, the "winners" remain the only winners, and 
the "losers" never become winners. When these "losers" represent the majority of the 
population, I think we can indeed say that an erosion of the social basis of the welfare state, 
largely due to its subordination to neoliberal economic policy, is occurring and is a threat. 
This phenomena explicates itself in a growing polarisation of economic and societal 
elements and interests, for example, in the "winners" and "losers" that I discussed. In this 
context, it would be worth asking the question as to whether or not the welfare state crisis is 
a matter of unaffordability and unfeasibility, or rather a matter of competing interests - a 
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competition in which the neoliberal economic interests appear to be at the forefront of ? 
Likely one question is not exc1usive of the other, however, as I have presented evidence 
for, neoliberal economic policy is c1early an interest which is increasingly being prioritised 
above the interests and basic elements of the social welfare state. 
To continue this discussion, it might be useful to consider to what degree the Keynesian 
Welfare State, in both its theoretical and applied form, is a truly desirable social, political 
and economic constellation. Throughout its existence it has not been without problems and 
contradictions, as it has inherited itf s socio-political formation from the foundations of a 
capitalistic "free" market, which itself embodies contradictions and faces crises in practice. 
I suggest, that to overcome the crises of the welfare state, we need to look at the more 
fundamental economic criteria on which it is founded, which bridges a whole other topic for 
discussion. As a starting point, the post-Keynesianism debate, underway in Canada since 
the 1970s, must be considered. As neoliberal approaches arose to combat the perceived 
economic and social problems facing Canada, an opposing force, namely that of post­
Keynesianism likewise took root. The basic tenants of post-Keynesianism are drawn from 
Keynesianism, social-democratic practices (themselves drawn fronl European models), and 
corporatist economic management techniques (based on European and Japanese models). In 
the words of Howlett and Ramesh (1994, 279), "although the theoretical tenets of post­
Keynesianism are contested by neo-liberals and by orthodox Marxists, it appears to be 
emerging as the basis for a new 'dominant political economic consensus. As such, the 
growing attraction of post-Keynesianism warrants closer scrutiny". Offered as an altenlative 
to neoliberalism, and a starting point for further debate, I grant this statement is true. 
However, I would also agree with Howlettfs and Rameshfs conclusions that "post­
Keynesianism lacks the theoretical coherence or political support necessary to become the 
dominant paradigm in Canadian political economy", and encourage a more fundanlental 
analysis of the current socio-economic struggles; an analysis which transgresses and 
challenges the theoretical presuppositions of not only neoliberalism, but the Keynesian 




a) 	The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement - Main Provisions. 
• 	 Manufactured goods: Removal of all bilateral tariffs starting on 1 January 1989 over a 
maximum period of ten years. 
• 	 Automotive: US-Canada Auto Pact continues. Canada I s embargo on imports of used 
cars to be eliminated. Duty remissions to be phased out. In order to benefit from tariff 
exemption, at least fifty per cent of the value of goods must originate in North America. 
• 	 Agriculture: Elimination of tariffs on agricultural trade within ten years and· the 
agreement not to use direct export subsidies on bilateral agricultural trade. 
• 	 Energy: Restrictions on exports of Canadian oil and gas can be imposed; however, any 
reduction in exports to the United States must be proportional to the total supply of oil 
and gas available in Canada, without price discrimination. 
• 	 Banking: Canada is to eliminate restrictions on acquisition of Canadian assets by US 
banks. Canadian banks will receive equal treatment under US Securities laws. 
• 	 Financial Services: Improved access and competition; national treatment for financial 
institutions. 
• 	 Road haulage, maritime and air transport: No change; but further restrictions ruled 
out. 
• 	 Other services: Liberalised access to enhanced telecommunications, computer services, 
tourism and architectural services. 
• 	 Government procurement: Exclusion of national preference on govemment contracts 
worth more than $25,000; exceptions for defence procurement. 
• 	 Direct investment: Restrictions onestablishing new fmns relaxed; extension of national 
treatment. 
• 	 Technical standards: Harmonisation of technical standards based on the GATT code. 
• 	 Emergency action and arbitration: More stringent standards for the application of 
arbitration emergency safeguards. Establishment of a dispute settlements mechanism and 
an independent arbitration panel. 
Source: External Affairs Canada, 1991. 
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b) The Main Elements of the NAFTA: 
• 	 Tariffs: Most tariffs on Canada-Mexico trade will be eliminated by the end of a ten­
year phase-in period starting on January 1994. Mexico will phase-out its tariffs on com 
and dried lentils over a 15-year period. The tariff phase-out on Canada-U.S. trade 
continues according to the FTA's 10-year schedule. 
• 	 Rules of origin: To qualify for preferential tariff treatment,goods must be wholly made 
in North America or, if incorporating imported inputs, have undergone sufficient 
transformation to qualify under a specific tariff classification. Some items, such as 
automotive goods, textiles and electronic goods must meet special North American 
content rules. 
• 	 Investment: The NAFTA employs the principles of national treatment and n10st­
favoured nation treatment to investments by other-party investors. Investn1ent Canada 
review thresholds for investments by NAFTA investors are the same as under the FTA. 
A separate settlement procedure is added for investment disputes. 
• 	 Services: The principles of national treatment and most -favoured nation treatment are 
applied to cross-border trade in services. Specifically excluded from the services chapter 
are social services provided by governments, basic telecommunications, most maritime 
and air services. 
• 	 Financial services: The principles of national treatment, most-favoured nation 
treatment, transparency and right of establishment, are established for trade in financial 
services. Sale of financial services across borders is permitted . Canadian foreign 
ownership restrictions on federally regulated financial institutions are removed from 
Mexican investors. Canadian and U. S. financial institutions will be permitted to 
establish in Mexico subject to market share restrictions until the year 2000. 
• 	 Governnlent Procurement: Procurements by specified govemment departments and 
agencies of goods and services over US$ 50 000, and construction services over US$ 
6.5 million, are opened up to competition from other NAFTA countries. The respective 
review thresholds for purchases by govemn1ent-owned enterprises are US$ 250 000 for 
goods and services and US$ 8 million for construction services. For procurements 
covered by the FTA, the dollar thresholds will continue to apply. 
• 	 Land Transportation: The NAFTA provides for the phase-out of barriers to the 
provision of land transportation services between the NAFTA countries. This includes: 
bus and trucking services and port services. Rail services remain open to competition. 
• 	 Telecommunications: The NAFTA removes baITiers to access for enhanced 
telecommunications services (but not basic services) by applying the principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination. The NAFTA limits the types of standards-related 
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measures that. can be imposed on the attachmeht of telecommunications equipment to 
public networks. 
• 	 Agriculture: Quotas essential to the maintenance of Canada' s supply management 
system for dairy, poultry and eggs are retained. Import licences in sectors of Canada­
Mexico trade will be replaced with tariffs or tariff-rate quotas. Canadian import 
restrictions covering wheat, barley, beef and vea1, and margarine will be removed 
immediately. 
• 	 Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters: The NAFTA retains the 
FTA' s dispute settlenlent provisions in antidunlping and countervailing duty matters 
involving binding decisions by panels. A special committee may be established upon 
request to determine whether a country' s law has interfered with the panel' s decision­
making. 
• 	 Institutional Arrangement and Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Trade Commis­
sion, the NAFT AlS central institution comprised of international trade ministers from 
each country, is to meet annually. A Secretariat will be established to serve the 
Commission as well as other subsidiary bodies and dispute settlement panels. Disputes 
regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement go first to consultation, then 
to the Trade Commission, then to a dispute settlement panel. 
• 	 Automotive Trade: Canada and Mexico will eliminate mutual tariffs: on automobiles 
by 50 % immediately and the remainder over 10 years; on light trucks by 50 % 
immediately and the remainder over five years; on other vehicles over ten years. 
Passenger automobiles, light trucks and engines and transmissions for these vehicles 
must eventually meet a 62.5 % North American content level based on the net cost 
formula; other vehicles must meet a 60 % content level. 
• 	 Textiles and Apparel: Most textile or apparel products nlust be made from yarn that is 
North American-made; Cotton and nlan-made fibre yarns must be made from fibres that 
are made in North America. Under tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), yams, fabric and apparel 
that do not meet the rules of origin can still qualify for preferential tariff treatment up to 
specified import levels. 
• 	 Energy and Basic Petrochemicals: The FTA's proportional sharing requirement is re­
tained on Canada-U.S. trade but this provision does not apply to trade with Mexico. 
Mexico opens non-basic petrochemicals and electricity-generating facilities to private in­
vestment; investment in Mexico' s other energy and basic petrochemicals industries 
remain reserved to the state. 
• Other measures: Disciplines are imposed on the development, adoption and 
enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Disciplines ar~ set out on the use 
of technical standards. Rules and procedures are established for taking "safeguard" 
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actions to provide temporary relief to domestic industries adversely affected by import 
surges. Disciplines are established on anticompetitive govemment and private sector 
business practices. The NAFTA requires each country to protect intellectual property 
rights. Provision is made for temporary entry of business persons. As established by the 
FTA, Canadian cultural industries remain exempt but the U.S. also retains the right to 
take measures of equivalent commercial effect. Other countries or groups of countries 
may be admitted into the Agreement if the NAFTA countries agree. Any country may 
withdraw from the Agreement on six-months' notice. 
Source: Library of Parliament 
7. References 
Alvarez, Alejandro and Gabriel Mendoza (1992): Mexico: Neo-Liberal Disaster Zone, in: Jim Sinc1air (ed.): 
Crossing the Line, Vancouver, New Star Books, pp. 26-37. 
Banting, Keith G. (1992): Neoconservatism in an Open Economy: The Social Role of the Canadian State, in: 
International Political Science Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 1992, pp. 149-170. 
Bello, Judith H. and Gilbert R. Winham (1992): The Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement: Issue of Process, 
in: Leonard Waverman (ed.): Negotiating and Implementing a North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Vancouver and Toronto, The Fraser Institute, pp. 29-60. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (1994): Politische Systeme unter Transformationsdruck: Soziale Desintegration and 
institutioneller Wandel in Westeuropa, in: Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Frank Deppe (Hrsg.): 
Entwicklungsprobleme des europäischen Kapitalismus, FEG Studie Nr. 4, Marburg, 1994, pp. 11-30. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen and Frank Deppe (Hrsg.) (1994): Entwicklungsprobleme des europäischen 
Kapitalismus, FEG Studie Nr. 4, Marburg. 
Buckley, Peter J. and co. (1994): Economic Integration: The Single European Market and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and their Implications for Canada-UK Bilateral Trade and Investment, m: 
British Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 375-400. 
Bultemeier, Anja (1994): Sozialer Sprengstoff in der EU? Zur integrationspolitischen Bedeutung der Ar­
beitslosigkeit, in: Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Frank Deppe (eds.): Entwicklungsprobleme des 
europäischen Kapitalismus, FEG Studie Nr. 4, Marburg, 1994, pp. 101-126. 
Cameron, Duncan (ed.) (1986): The Free Trade Papers, Toronto, James Lorimer & Company, Publishers. 
Campbell, Bruce (1994): Trade and Investment Policy Under NAFTA: As If Jobs Mattered, in: Canadian For­
eign Policy, Spring 1994, vol. 2 no. 1, pp. 147-161. 
Chapman, Anthony (1993): North American Free Trade Agreement: Rationale and Issues, Ottowa, Library of 
Parliament Research Branch. 
Charest, Jean (1992/93): Trade, the Environment and Competitiveness, in: Canadian Foreign Policy, Winter 
1992/93, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 121-127. 
Chomsky, Noam (interviewed by David Barsamian) (1994): Secrets, Lies and Democracy, Tucson, Arizona, 
Odonian Press. 
Clarke, Tony (1992): Fighting Free Trade, Canadian Style, in: Jim Sinc1air (ed.): Canada and Free Trade 
With Mexico: Crossing the Line, Vancouver, New Star Books, pp. 122-127. 
43 
Cohen, Marjorie Griffin (1992): The Lunacy of Free Trade, in: Jim Sinc1air (ed.): Canada and Free Trade 
With Mexico: Crossing the Line, Vancouver, New Star Books, pp. 14-25. 
Cueva, Hector de la (1992): Statement of Hector de la Cueva, in: William Jr. McGaughey: A U.S.-Mexico­
Canada free Trade Agreement: Do We Just Say No?, Minneapolis, 1992, Thistlerose Publications, 
pp. 186-187. 
Dasko, Donna (1986): Canadian Public Opinion: Sources of Support and Dissent, in: Duncan Cameron (ed.): 
The Free Trade.Papers, Toronto, James Lorimer & Company Publishers, pp. 26-32. 
Dasko, Donna (1988): The Free Trade Deal, in: Duncan Cameron (ed.): The Free Trade Deal, Toronto, 
James Lorimer & Company Publishers, pp. 246-254. 
Doern, G. Bruce and Brian W. Tomlin (1991): Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story, Stoddart, Publishing 
Co. Ltd. 
Eden, Lorraine and Maureen Appel Molot (1992): The View from the Spokes: Canada and Mexico Face the 
Uni ted States, in: Stephen J. Randall (ed.): North America Without Borders?: Integrating Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, pp. 67-82. 
Esping-Anderson, Gosta (1990): The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
External Affairs and International Trade Canada (1991): Moving Into Europe, EAlTC. 
Greens and Green Party USA (1993): NAFTA: Bad for Mexico, Bad for Canada, Bad for the U.S., in: Green­
leaflet no. 6, off the Internet. 
Grinspun, Ricardoand Robert Kreklewich (1994): Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: "Free Trade" as a Con­
ditioning Framework, in: Studies in Political Economy, no. 43, Spring 1994, pp. 33-61. 
Hirsch, Michael (1995): Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1995, pp. 16-18. 
Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh (1994): Post-Keynesianism in Canada in the 1990s: An emerging Paradigm 
or a Hopeless Muddle?, in: British Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 278-299. 
International Monetary Fund (1992): Direction ofTrade Statistics, Yearbook 1992, Washington, D.C., IMF. 
Lavon, Eva and Dieter Plehwe (1994): Delaware - Puerto-Rico - Los Angeles: Überlegungen zu Ökonomie, 
Gesellschaft and Politik in den Vereinigten Staaten, in: Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Frank Deppe 
(Hrgs.): Entwicklungsprobleme des europäischen Kapitalismus, FEG Studie Nr. 4, Marburg, pp. 45­
66. 
Lavon, 	Eva (1994): Das Nordamerikanische Freihandelsabkommen (NAFTA): Weltmarktorientierte Ent­
wicklung gegen die Gewerkschaften, FEG Studie Nr. 3, Marburg. 
Laux, Jeanne Kirk (1990/91): Limits to Liberalism, in: International Journal, vol. 46, no. 1, Winter 1990/91, 
pp. 113-136. 
Leibfried, Stephan and Paul Pierson 	(1992): Prospects for Social Europe, in: Politics and Society, vol. 30, 
no. 3, September 1992, pp. 333-336. 
MacLaren, Roy (1994): The Road from Marrakech: The Quest for Economic Internationalism in an Age of 
Ambivalence, in: Canadian Foreign Policy, Spring 1994, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-8. 
Maclean's, Aug. 24, 1992, vol. 106, no. 34, pp. 44-47. 
Maclean 's, Nov. 29, 1993, vol. 106. no. 48, pp. 29-35. 
Maclean 's, Dec. 13 1993, vol. 106, no. 50, p.14. 
44 

McGaughey, William Ir. (1992): A U.S. - Mexico - Canada Free Trade Agreement: Do We Just Say No?, 
Minneapolis, Thistlerose Publications. 
Panitch, Leo (1994): Globalisation and the State, in: Socialist Register, 1994, pp. 60-93. 
Phillips, Susan D. (ed.) (1993): How Ottowa Spends: A More Democratic Canada?, Ottowa, Cadton 
University Press. 
RandalI, Stephen J. (ed.) (1992): North America Without Borders?: Integrating Canada, the United States, 
and Mexico, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 
Rice, James J. and Michael J. Prince (1993): Lowering the Safety Net and Weakening the Bonds of Nation­
hood: Social Policy in the Mulroney Years, in: SusanD. Phillips (ed.): How Ottowa Spends: A More 
Democratic Canada?, Ottowa, Cadeton University Press. 
Robinson,Ian (1993): The NAFTA, Democracy and Continental Economic Integration: Trade Policy as if De­
mocracy Mattered, in: Susan D. Phillips (ed.): How Ottowa Spends: A More Democratic Canada?, 
Ottowa, Cadton University Press. 
Schiller, Theo (1994): Sozialpolitik in Kanada in den 80er Jahren, Baden-Baden, Nomos Vedagsgesellschaft. 
Schottland, Charles 1. (1970): The Socia! Security Program in the United States, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Sinclair, lim (ed.) (1992): Canada and Free Trade with Mexico: Crossing the Line, Vancouver: New Star 
Books. 
Statistics Canada (1984): Canada Handbook, Ottowa: Canadian Govemment Publishing Centre. 
Statistics Canada (1989): Canada Yearbook 1990, Ottowa: Canadian Govemment Publishing Centre. 
Talos, Emmerich (1993): Umbau des Wohlfahrtsstaates: Konträre Begründungen und Optionen, in: Öster­
reichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, no. 1, 1993, pp. 37-55. 
Vobruba, Georg (1993): Bedeutungsverluste von Staatsgrenzen, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politik­
wissenschaft, no. 1, 1993, pp. 85-91. 
Wamock, lohn W. (1988): Free Trade and the New Right Agenda, Vancouver, New Star Books. 
Wasser, Hartmut (Hrsg.) (1991): USA: Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Politik, Opladen, Leske and Budrich. 
Wavennan, Leonard (ed.) (1992): Negotiating and Implementing a North American Free Trade Agreement, 
Vancouver and Toronto, The Fraser Institute. 
Winham, Gilbert R. (1994): NAFTA and the Trade Policy Revolution of the 1980s: a Canadian Perspective, 
in: International Journal, Summer 1994, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 472-508. 









(September 1992) UKB 20 DM (vergriffen) 





(September 1993) UKB 25 DM 

Nr. 3: Eva Lavon, Das Nordamerikanische Freihandelsabkommen (NAFTA): Weltmarktorientierte 

Entwicklung gegen die Gewerkschaften?, 

(Juni 1994) UKB 20 DM 





(August 1994) UKB 25 DM 

Nr. 5: Europäische Integration und politische Regulierung - Aspekte, Dimensionen, Perspektiven. Mit 

Beiträgen von Bob Jessop, Ingeborg Tömmel, Bernd Röttger, Anja Bultemeier/Frank Deppe, Thorsten 

Schulten, Nikos Kotzias und Hans-Jürgen Bieling,' 

(April 1995) UKB 25 DM 

Nr. 6: Robin Jacobitz, Der Niedergang institutionalisierter Kooperation. Die Auswirkungen von 





(Juli 1995) UKB 30 DM 





(November 1995) UKB 40 DM 

FEG: Leiter Prof. Dr. F. Deppe; Redaktion Arbeitspapiere und Studien: F. Deppe, J. Steinhilber 

Bestellungen an FEG, 

Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Philipps-Universität Marburg, 

Wilhelm-Röpke-Straße 6, Block G, 35032 Marburg, Tel.: 064211285685 

